Chapter Eight: PATHOLOGICAL CODES
1. The Communicational Failure of the Type
In the sealed environment of the integrated state, the capacity of a Type to learn from experience atrophies. Its behaviour endlessly circulates around the compressed sequence of routines which it had developed as a classical architecture, before it crossed the threshold into involution. It has already been pointed out, however, that this typical set, while it remains intact, is subject to a continual process of reduction and simplification. Thus, even although this Type has evolved out of the representation of many different contexts, the actual number of possible combinations that can be extracted from it has been considerably reduced by the constant action of the typological process. It ends up with a few well-rehearsed routines which it applies to the endless stream of different contexts which it must face. (This is, of course, apart from the massive repertoire of decorative devices which it has extruded into architectural production as displaced diversity. The important point here is that there are now two dimensions of architectural activity for the Type).
Since the typical set defines the range of possible acts open to architects for combination, in effect it defines a mode of perception of experience which excludes other 'non-classifiable' forms or modes of selection and combination. (‘Non-classifiable’ of course simply means anything which is not ‘this’). The set becomes a way of looking at the world; a 'way' which can only recognize certain aspects of that world and which cannot recognize others, whether they exist or not. As in other forms of representation, the typical set does not simply and impartially re-present 'things as they are' with all the diversity of forms and pragmatic adjustments that this would require, but must to impose its own necessarily limited number of forms and arrangements on the complex realities of experience outside architecture.
Representation generally and in the case of architecture in particular therefore, BOTH reveals the order of things AND disguises it. Using the forms at its disposal, the system of representation reveals it by modelling certain general aspects of it with a corresponding arrangement of its own forms. At the same time it disguises it by the necessarily limited number of forms and arrangements it has at its disposal. In other words, the model cannot be as complex as the reality which it represents. However, it is not this systemic arbitrariness which is at issue here, it is, rather, the much more extreme condition of a set of forms which has become so limited that it excludes the representation of almost any aspect of its context. It presents itself as a new reality while the contexts which it supposedly represents simply become particular instances of the expression. Of its character.
Inevitably, during the Involutionary period, the Type ‘misinterprets’ the signals it receives from the contexts which it must represent. It simply cannot find a suitable response to any context within its own typological repertoire; it views each very particular context as a call for a repeat of its general proposition. It cannot do otherwise for the typical set is all that there is. At its least destructive, such a lack of flexibility of behaviour is simply labelled as being 'out of touch with reality'. At its worst, given an extremely limited set of possible acts, it can lead to a complete collapse of communication with its environment. Indeed, in the later stages of compression, it is only the camouflage of its decorative devices that maintains the Types ability to represent anything. It is this tendency of the Type to apply the same encoded message in totally different contexts which destroys its semantic credibility.
If, as the use of the term 'trauma' implies, there is some fault or pathology in this condition, then it expresses itself in this gross over-simplification of reality. The representations produced by an architecture in this state are in fact a caricature of the relations which prevail in the real world. It is upon this mistaken perception of the world that architecture continues to attempt to construct an authentic representation. It is a demand for performance from which there is no escape or, at least, not one that one can be achieved by architecture but only by a random change in the socioeconomic state of its society. The mode of behaviour developed by architecture at such a time reflects the contained space of the integrated society, which, in its turn denies the unalterable diversity of the world. Again: a part of experience is mistaken for the whole.
One can see in this description a clear analogy of with the same traumatic conditions and communicational problems as they might apply in individual psychology, one can, by analogy perhaps gain a sharper insight into the distortions which such conditions impose on the classification of reality by a stereotyped and rigid architecture. This analogy would be based on the fact that in both cases in a confined and inherently ambiguous environment there is a failed attempt to find adequate or appropriate behavioural routines for complex situations.
One could say that this malformation of an organism's conceptual map – its way of understanding the world - is also a result of its inability to escape from a pathological environment. (The term 'pathological' is used in the sense that it induces a kind of behaviour which is either ineffective in different environments or variations of the same environment, or, leads the organism towards self-destructive collisions with that environment.). The problem is this: that this trauma – a massive reduction on what it is able to express - is replaced by another in the course of history, the organism is unable to function adequately. An individual's perception, founded on a small and unrepresentative fraction of experience, is rendered useless when set in a wider social environment containing many different contexts.
It is not, of course, just the constancy of the environment which produces the trauma which locks architecture around a few simple and unrepresentative forms. This, like the continuity of an historical era, simply ensures that whatever is taking place will achieve a maximum and possibly irreversible cumulative effect. Within this time-frame, an involutionary Type of behaviour is the result of the anxiety which follows from some uncertainty of relationship in the inescapable environment. For architecture that uncertainty comes about through the progressive reduction of its semiotic freedom in the involutionary conditions which now prevail. That is a reduction in its capacity to say what it has to say in any given situation. With the gradual reduction of ‘legitimate’ ways of expressing social experience in built form, there is an increasing number of clashes of expectation between architecture and its social environment with the latter seemingly much more ambiguous and whose character cannot be easily defined. There is a tendency in other words, for architects (skilful or otherwise) to ‘get it wrong’ by producing inappropriate responses to different (and apparently ambiguous) contexts given the means they have available to them. In a sense the language of expression has contracted to the point of being inarticulate.
The same kinds of problems plague the world of individual psychology when the social environment from which an individual cannot escape continually displays ambiguous or contradictory messages. Equally, in these pathological environments, there is a very limited number of legitimate or acceptable ways the individual can respond to such ambiguity. What are deemed inappropriate responses to contradictory demands by the environment may result in some sort of punishment; but then, in an environment like this, all responses will be seen as ‘wrong’ or inappropriate. Yet an individual must somehow still function in these unstable and pathological social conditions.
There is no choice in the matter for no matter how tenuous or contradictory the social relations are within such a context some definite modus operandi must be constructed simply to exist within it. This raises the curious question: what is a definite response to an ambiguous situation? What would the behavioural characteristics of such a response be? Clearly, the answer is not more ambiguity; the problem for the individual is to deal with the ambiguity by devising some strategy which RE-DEFINES every message which arises from that environment.
In non-pathological environments messages usually mean what they appear to mean. This is not the case in a fundamentally ambiguous environment where they might not mean what 'they say'. Whereas in a 'normal' environment the individual forms a comprehensive routine by essentializing and fusing many different messages together, in the pathological environment described above, the first requirement is to break each message down and analyse it. In striving to overcome the ambiguity of some of these messages, the individual splits them into their literal and contextual components and treats each as a separate issue, remembering of course that what people say is not necessarily what they mean. Another aspect of this is that the routine so formed is a result of the ADDITION of a lot of such uncoupled messages together rather than their fusion (which is itself an ambiguous rendering of different experiences). The crucial difference between these two modes of consolidating experience; addition and fusion will be dealt with later; for the moment one can outline some of the characteristics (symptoms) of behaviour derived from a pathological-ambiguous environment. (Note that although ambiguity is a feature of the complexity of all contexts, it is usually set in the midst of more stable and fixed relationships. It is when the latter is missing or negligible that the environment becomes pathological). some of the symptoms of 'Involutionary' behaviour in individuals might be as follows: literal interpretation of messages; reification of context of message; displacement of contextual clues into peripheral behaviour: gestures, 'attitudes'; the assumption of masks; loss of connotative meaning; withdrawal into a fantasy world; rigid behaviour general. It is only in terms of a wider context, or one which is simply different to that in which an individual acts that the above responds can be regarded as pathological.
In terms of the individual’s own perception of his or her environment, these are perfectly rational attempts to come to terms with the relations which he or she meets in that usual environment. The individual LEARNS to cope with the ambiguity of his or her situation by evolving these routines. As an example of the sort of conditions where such behaviour would be learned one can consider the situation where the individual is continually subject to contradictory demands which cannot be resolved. For instance, if the individual accedes to the demands of one person or group, he or she is condemned and punished by others. If they accede to the demands of the others, they are condemned and punished by the first person or group. The responses required of the individual in such a situation are mutually exclusive. Whatever the individual does in this situation THEY WILL BE WRONG. The messages coming from the environment are inherently ambiguous.
In these circumstances, it is impossible for an individual to behave spontaneously authentically in any communication. They are continually faced with what Gregory Bateson calls a 'double bind' and it is an intolerable situation from which they cannot escape. They are forced to search for the meaning of the meaning of the messages which they receive for simply responding to the apparent meaning has always resulted in punishment.
2. The Splitting of the Message
Even in an insane environment he individual must ‘perform’ by confronting society and its complex messages; messages which are wrapped in contextual clues as to how they should be understood. However, these are clues which, if they are incorrectly deciphered, will lead to punishment. The only choice open to the individual is to find, in the contextual aura which surrounds each message (which is part of the message) that kernel of certainty. This applies both to his or her own messages as well as to those received from others. The problem in the past, from the individual's learned point of view, seems to have been a constant misunderstanding of the contextual clues which came with each message. The problem was never that the literal meaning of the message could not be understood; indeed it could, but a spontaneous response to this apparent meaning was always found to be wrong. This response always seemed to be out of context; to be correct, but always for some other time or place. A time or place which never arose. The result of this long period of learning is that the individual, although perfectly capable of understanding the words that he or she hears, cannot react appropriately to the message in the manner (the context) in which it is supposedly meant.
There are, therefore, two aspects to this communicative pathology; the first is an over-precise attempt to identify the meaning of messages sent by others. The second is a displacement of the connotative meaning (the what is meant) behind a screen of sometimes inappropriate words of gestures. In an extreme case the denotative meaning of these words may mean the exact opposite to the connotative meaning. Less dramatically, pathological communications of this kind become an endless series of digressions on a subject, the name of which cannot be mentioned. (This refers back to the earlier discussion on the aphasic condition, where what is meant cannot be expressed. In that case, the violence of the typological process compresses the meaning of many words which one highly-charged denotative mode. One may also relate this kind of communication to the literary style of modern drama: to the dialogues of Pinter and Beckett's characters with their ambiguous and inconsequential conversations.) The other point to notice about the displacement of meaning behind word-screens is that for some individuals, a clear statement of what they mean places them in a relationship with an other who may arbitrarily punish them. Their past experience has taught them not to place themselves in such a relationship to others.
At its simplest, therefore, one may describe this pathological mode of communication as having two components: a strictly literal classification of messages (either sent or received), plus the assumption of more or less appropriate contextual masks in terms of word, gesture or attitude. The 'success' of this device of splitting the denotative and connotative meanings of messages into separate categories of behaviour depends on the complexity of the communication in which an individual is involved. Much of ordinary communication involves multiple levels of contextual information condensed around literally simple messages. This is certainly the case in close personal relations. In these situations, an individual who had been conditioned in a pathological ambiguous environment, would find it difficult to read the compressed clues which surround the message and which identify how it should be received. For instance, a joke could not be understood if the words were taken literally, nor could irony or sarcasm or many other normal forms of speech which rely on complex levels of meaning acting within the same message. The more complex the communication, the less it can be understood by fragmenting it into its constituent parts and subjecting each to analysis. One cannot simply add these 'bits' together to get the meaning; it is their fusion and interaction which defines the message. In pathological communication, the fracture lines of this kind of atomistic analysis will always be visible rendering such communications at least unconventional and at worst, incomprehensible.
3. Reinforcing the Trauma
Post-traumatic experience in the new or different environment does not automatically resolve pathological behaviour. The individual (or an architecture for that matter) do not learn anew. In behavioural terms they do not start from scratch Normal social intercourse, in some cases, cannot erode the fault which lies in the internal map which conditions an individual's behaviour for it is too deeply programmed to be unlearned or adjusted by diverse experiences. While the messages which come from this environment ‘mean what they say’, the traumatized individual cannot say what they mean, for, according to past experience, they could be traps laid specifically for his or her confusion. Once again, depending on the degree of the trauma's intensity, normal social intercourse can reinforce the distorted view of the world held by such individuals. As they move through society their unconventional and inappropriate responses draw hostility from others for they are unable to decipher other peoples signals. The ambiguous and contradictory nature of communication is thereby confirmed and the rigid routines set up in the past are confirmed, since it still seems to be necessary to search for the real meaning of each apparent meaning. That is a continuing and ultimately futile search for absolute precision and certainty; a possibility which is destroyed by the very means used to achieve it.
Consequently, the displacement of connotative meaning (the context of the individuals particular message), its splitting from the literal meaning, becomes more radical and requires the assumption of more unconventional forms and masks. Another way of looking at this is to consider that the chains of association which link the spoken word to its actual meaning grow longer: it becomes more difficult for others to pin down what an individual actually means by the words they speak. The masks which an individual uses both to appear to communicate correctly and yet to avoid communication are also subject to demand for precision. (If they wear the wrong mask in a particular context, they generate hostility). But, the multiple layers of contextual clues which surround some messages, the shifting of those layers during the course of conversation and the incorporation of deliberate ambiguity all act to make the assumption of the correct mask an impossible task. The attempt to isolate each of these layers and to identify them, the formation of appropriate responses to each and the 'addition' of these masks into a response merely produces a distorted message. The words used by the individual as a mask, but which hopefully will bear some relationship to an other's message, increasingly fail to match or fit the context defined by the communication taking place between the two parties. They become increasingly inappropriate as do the expressions, pauses, intonations and body language of the individual for they are all separated from each other and from the subject of the communication. It is not that such an individual is choosing not to communicate about a subject - indeed they are - the problem is that the contorted MEANS which they use to do so is incapable of fulfilling this task. Nor, of course, is the individual aware of the inappropriateness of his or her means of communication, for they have found that in the past this has proved its worth in dealing with social relations. (The problem is, of course, that those previous relations were themselves pathological and do not provide a relevant model of normal processes of communication). Thus, the individual regards his or her responses to be perfectly rational and apposite to the messages of others. The fact that these responses draw hostility simply means that a more precise identification of their meanings is required, so it would seem.
As in architecture these futile attempts to find the perfect and precise fit to context on the basis of a fundamentally faulty premise can only lead to radical distortions of behaviour (from the point of view of others), and eventually, a final collapse into complete incomprehensibility. The architecture of Involution overwhelmed by its own attempts to clarify its forms and simultaneously adjust them to particular cases similarly collapses under a welter of decorative devices and sub-styles.
4. The Analyst as Critic
For the architectural critic as analyst of this involutionary architecture the task is to disentangle the thick webs of evasion and unintentional deceit which are the masks of that central rigid classification. It is an attempt to expose to view the rigid formal structure or geometry of relations which architecture has been programmed into imposing on all acts of communication no matter what the context. It is this structure – this perception of things - which forms the template upon which the design of each building is organized. To a greater or lesser degree, therefore, each building as a message about a particular context is an arbitrary formulation since it is based not on the pragmatics of exchange or free translation of its character but on a pre-determined set of set of relations typed out of experiences which deny or negate contextual identification. The result is pathological to the extent that it is too rigid to handle complex communications and, indeed, in some cases actually destroys the possibility of communication.
The organizing principle which informs this set of relations is one of splitting all material into literal and contextual components; and in doing so at all levels and at all scales of communication. All messages are therefore differentiated into primary and secondary meanings. Note that this is an entirely different matter from saying that there is one message composed of several linguistic components. Even if the intention is to transmit a single, clearly-defined meaning, this simply does not happen because of the way the system, whether architecture or individual organizes the syntax of the statement. The formal structure imposed on syntactic material and which has been learned from past experience prevents the direct expression of meaning. Contextual information is stripped away and reified into a sub-routine which is then placed in an adjacent relationship to key words or in some cases actually substitutes for them. In non-pathological communication, contextual information is used to directly condition key words and their meaning. These two components of the message cannot be separated for they act together to generate the overall meaning. Without context, key words can mean almost anything and it is only by surrounding them with contextual clues that they refer to something IN PARTICULAR. The strict application of a pathological structure on to linguistic material, therefore, can generate several independent meanings for one message. Even although this formal structure (the redundancy of the message) was developed precisely to eliminate the problem of ambiguity, it results in its creation.
In architectural terms, the difference between these two different perceptions of the same message (one pathological, the other authentic), can be compared to two different ways of perceiving the typical set. In one, complex contexts are represented by a strict application of canonical and immutable elements plus an autonomous layer of decoration. In the authentic perception of context, while the unity of the typical set still exists, its element can be subject to modification to suit the particular circumstances. In this case, while each element may be ambiguous when viewed in isolation, since it has been distorted to suit its location, the overall meaning of the building is quite clear. With an Involutionary formal organization, while each element is perfectly unambiguous in its character, the ADDITION of these elements together in the whole work and the addition of the decorative clues renders the building ambiguous. In this case the character of the elements is too clearly identified; perceptually the form of the work tends to fall apart into its constituent elements.
5. The Grid
Since the formal structure discussed above is essentially a mode of perception which organizes every aspect of experience, it will be applied to all scales of architecture from the most minute details of single buildings up to the level of the Type. Each part of a building and each part of that part will be organized to this precise grid of relations determined beforehand.
As an example of what this might mean when applied to architecture one can look at its effect when applied to the spatial distribution of a building; on the proximities, concentrations, successions, symmetries, enclosures and diffusions of space. If, for a moment, 'space' is considered to be a material which can be manipulated (a view which, frankly, has only theoretical value - a matter which will be dealt with later), then the application of a 'schizoid' formal structure to it would produce a very particular type of architectural organization. Generally, with the imposition of this kind of structure, there would be a tendency to sharply define the relationships between different spaces: the building would be organized as an aggregate of semi-autonomous places held together by a rigid geometry. The hierarchic organization of the building would be expressed in the most direct and literal manner as an ASSEMBLAGE of dominant and subordinate spaces. The assumed need to precisely identify different parts of the building volumetrically would be reinforced by a tendency to disperse the overall form of the building. More fundamentally, a schizoid perception of architecture leads to the somewhat curious question: 'How does one split space?' (This is, of course, apart from any physical considerations. It is a much more abstract question of how architectural space is conceived in an Involutionary period.) The answer is that space is defined by the nature of the activities which take place within it. Thus, in order to 'split' it, it is necessary to identify the groups and sub-groups of those activities ad infinitum. Having named these constituent functions, they can be allocated a precise spatial identity. The crucial factor for such a perception of architectural space is that the functional zones so defined are purified of differences - they refer to ONE activity, and one only. From this one can conclude that the schizoid perception of architectural space produces a crude functionalism. It relies entirely on an ability to impose a literal name on to different aspects of one activity. In order to discover (in fact, to impose), an unshakable certainty as to the precise meaning of architectural space - to make it a thing - simple differences within the context are reified into DISTINCTIONS.
There is nothing inherent in the formal structure of an Involutionary period which renders it 'schizoid'. The fragmentation of architectural form which occurs then is entirely due to the fact that architectural material is already highly condensed.. The communicational intention remains exactly the same, but the environment in which it takes place is different. Locked within the integrated state for a prolonged period, the Type has been unified as far as possible. As pointed out in an earlier chapter, further action on architectural material can only lead to its differentiation. Free and pragmatic exchange of forms is blocked for the only resource upon which this action can draw (while still remaining comprehensible) is that already defined by the Type and which has unified the whole of architectural production with a few highly-charged forms. It has become impossible to communicate authentically without, at the same time appearing incomprehensible, with all that means in terms of rejection. Like the pathological individual, architecture is trapped in an oscillation from which it cannot escape since it is located in the very organization of its environment. The resolution of this essentially communicational problem, both for an architecture and for an individual, is to split the task of representation into two distinct categories:
a) Those sets which are fundamental, immutable and deeply programmed. (The typical set of primary forms or learned behaviours. At this stage in history, after waves of reduction, these few highly-charged forms essentially define the identity of the system).
b) Those sets which can vary from place to place, namely contextual elements. (Decoration, improvisation, slang, allegories and masks which can be modified to suit changing circumstances).
This way, at least the sanctity of the Type is supposedly retained in all its purity, while once again it becomes possible to act freely by manipulating the contextual elements.
Condemned by historical chance to operate within an already highly-unified environment, architectural activity is forced to take up a primarily analytical or ‘scholastic’ role. A role which cannot avoid the tendency to define absolutely fixed categories, even where they do not exist in reality. Since the Involutionary perception cannot transcend the historical circumstances in which it exists (and which makes it what it is), it assumes the existing Type is the map of all possible architectural statements. It is, in this sense unable to meta-communicate about existing conditions for there is NO wider context in which the existing Type can be set - this Type describes the whole of architectural production. It must also misunderstand the nature of the contextual variations of the classic Type which are not at all ambiguous, but are economic responses to real conditions. At that point in history and viewed from within the discourse of architecture they cannot be seen for what they really are. The future course of an Involutionary period is the continuing attempt to resolve 'ambiguity' and concentrate architectural form into a set of severe and immutable elements.
Architectural form is condensed beyond any rational requirements and enters a period of imaginary perfections.
6. The Critic as Analyst
When the architectural critic comments on the forms used in the current production he or she demands that architects reveal to themselves the basis of the choices they have made. It is also an appeal to architects to give up the automatism in which they have been led by the enclosed conditions of an involutionary period. Part of this critical commentary involves setting current forms into their historical context and thus investing them with a wholeness which contrasts with their current function as parts of a more comprehensive symbol. Originally, these forms had a capacity to respond differently to different circumstances; they could be modified as the need arose. However, with the condensation of diverse types into a single classic Type and with the further condensations taking place during an Involutionary period, this original quality is essentialized out and many independent elements integrated with each other. In pointing to the former wholeness and integrity of these forms which now lie embedded in the monolith of the Involutionary Type, the critic overloads them with meaning and seeks to explode the Type into a multiplicity. What the critic is doing here is, in a sense, to fictitiously REVERSE the typological integrations of architectural material which have taken place over a long period of time by injecting context back into that material. What had become mere architectural fragments are expanded back into a semblance of whole routines which invoke a memory of a time in architecture when there were many possibilities: when it was possible to say the same thing in different ways. The critical commentary is subversive of the existing architectural order to this extent, that it points to the historical nature of the existing Type: there had been other types before and that there is not the only way of perceiving the world of architectural form.
In revealing the multiplicity of sources upon which the Type is founded and their original complexity, the critic discredits the existing order of things and rejects its claim to be an inevitable and 'NATURAL' order. The time-scale involved in the passage of a whole architectural cycle makes it difficult for architects to imagine that the world of form was not always as it is now. The comparison which the critic makes between the present state of things and that of the past are not important because the critic dredges up alternative forms from the past which could be used as part of the current repertoire. History cannot be reversed nor does it offer architectural solutions. The importance of these comparisons lies not in their content but simply in the absolute fact of their DIFFERENCES. By injecting context into current architectural elements, the critic makes it difficult for the Type to hold together in one configuration a multiplicity of whole elements which had formerly been mere parts of its total complex. The critic seeks to re-establish the organisational level and diversity of architectural types each of which has a distinctive character of its own. Like the avant-garde, the architectural critic tries to force an Involutionary Type to travel along the road it must inevitably go; but to do so much more quickly than it otherwise would. It is a road which leads to its eventual disintegration.
In the therapeutic terms, the critic forces the existing Type to ABREACT by confronting it with its own origins and the historical circumstances which locked it into this particular mode of expression. In setting the elements of the Type into the wider historical context and in thus opening up the possibility of meta-communication about the current crisis of authenticity facing the Type, the critic transcends the hypnotic immediacy of conditions. The elements of the typical set are made to speak of their previous richness of expression and no longer silently affirm the totalitarian order of the Type nor acquiesce in its annexation of their characteristics. The existing symbol ceases to be the absolute measure of experience when it is made clear that the Type is one historical incident and that there could be others.
In pursuing this goal, the critic forces the Imaginary ‘one’ to become the Symbolic ‘many’. When the critic asks the meaning of a particular selection and combination of forms, the architect is forced to expand on the classifications which have been used to make this choice. This is the role of the critic: to force a re-classification of existing classifications. Nothing may be taken for granted. The fragility of the Involutionary Type depends for its functioning on the performance of all its parts AS PARTS. These elements can only perform the most specific of tasks like the parts of a machine, the meaning of each is entirely dependent on the function of the whole assembly. In architecture, the critical analysis liberates the parts of the Involutionary mechanism from the determinism of the whole. Further, the supposedly rational quality of that whole is exposed as irrational for in order to function it must ignore or evade the complexity of real conditions. It substitutes a predictable part of experience for a whole which it cannot control nor represent without, at the same time, dissolving itself.
The proliferation of secondary features - decorative displacement - express this irrationality perfectly. The Type may have to exist in a complex and uncertain world but it does not have to BE of that world. To this end, it projects a screen of defence mechanisms - masks - which, at least allow it to APPEAR to function as a natural and authentic order. So ubiquitous are the forms of the Type and so regular are the relations between them, that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of alternative (and comprehensible) solutions to the problems faced by architecture. It is certainly possible to point to the growing inconsistencies of the Type; its tendency to apply general propositions to unique circumstances, its spurious monumentality, its use of superficial signs of difference, but it is another matter to offer alternatives. The only frame of reference for action is the prevailing typical set. This is a completely self-referring system which cancels criticism by displacing it into allegories. The Type, therefore deals with diversity and difference in this manner without, at the same time being contaminated by it. The profusion of decoration and the increasingly emphatic quality of its products are the negative expression of its internal positivism.
The critic cannot offer alternatives to the existing architecture. All that can be done is to heighten the sense of crisis which pervades the architectural activity of the time. In unmasking this rigid 'ideal type', criticism merely shows that it is not a true representation of experience. Historically, the critical attack on an architecture has centred in many cases on the fantastic decoration used by the Type and to its misapplication of historical elements. The first is condemned as a form of lies or deceit and the second as an instance of inconsistency. But, in cutting through the cluster of evasive devices, critical analysis does not simply demand their removal as mere encrustations on the surface of an otherwise 'pure' architecture. It is not a question of stripping them away in this manner. In demanding an end to decoration and to the gross over-articulation of forms, the critic is, in fact, crying out for the destruction of the Involutionary Type. Without these devices it would cease to exist. It is only these which allow its petrified forms to appear to be a comprehensive architectural routine. This is the true location of the 'lie'; it exists in that separation between substance and appearance, between form and content. So specialized has the typical set become since its developmental stage that it can effectively represent only a fraction of experience. However, it is a fraction which poses as a whole.
The architectural critic recognizes the false plurality of such an architecture and that, contrary to appearances, the over-articulation of buildings is a negation of experience. It is the way the Type avoids an authentic response to a particular context. In rejecting the exclusion of complexity from the typical set which prevents it from direct expression of any context, the critic requires that architecture once again should seek to represent the whole of experience and the complex relations which constitute it. This is the basis of the 'truth' which the architectural critic call for in the architecture of his or her time: that its forms should arise out of the immediacy of experience. It is also the basis of the references which the critic makes to 'nature' (or, in the later 20th century, to ecology), to the 'organic', to the utility of the everyday object. It is through this return to simplicity and to 'ordinariness' that the critic sees architecture renewing itself as a true representation of the world.
7. The Critic as Regulator
As suggested earlier, one could imagine a virtually immortal socio-economic system – a society which would produce an architecture which is in a continual process of projecting endless variations on its central architectural theme. Action, performance and the continuous production of buildings continues as before. For all its business such an architecture would look much more complex and plural than it actually is since it would still be orientated to some typological trauma which occurred at some point in its past; a trauma which locked its development around a specific and very limited set of characteristic forms.
These variations on a theme provoked by the impossibly restricted repertoire of the Type can be seen as an attempt by architects to meta-communicate about current conditions. It is a way of appearing to be different and authentic without fundamentally challenging the premises upon which formal choices are made. Premises embodied in the typical set which informs the whole of production. (Neo-classicism is still Classicism) It is a way of extricating communication from the paradoxes generated by a totally determined form of discourse clashing with the infinite diversity of the environment to which it must respond. It is a futile attempt to de-condense the tightly-knit complex of permissible acts which bind together the whole of production. Given the surface complexity of the Involutionary architecture produced by decoration and allegory, what might seem at the time to be a new ability to directly express the relations of particular contexts (to communicate authentically), will, from a wider perspective be seen as an act of displacement. It simply lengthens the associative chain between the denotative meaning of the primary forms of the typical set and the connotative meaning of decoration improvised for particular contexts. It will be the production of metaphors of an existing metaphor.
The important issue for the architectural critic in these times is to decipher among the plethora of different architectural options what is and what is not simply a matter of ‘styling’. To this end, the critic directs his or her attention to that more central formative activity: the relation of the form to what it supposedly represents; not particularly the relation of one form to another or one style to another. The critic cuts away the whole issue of one 'style' against another 'style' in order to get at that synchronous activity and to bring it to the forefront of the debates on architecture. In many cases it is put forward as a question of 'morality'.
Like that of the avant-garde architect, the role of the critic varies from period to period. It is a change in role which is akin to the change which transforms the diverse decoration of the Involutionary period into the standardized decoration of evolutionary periods or which requires an avant garde to take up a rationalist position at one point or a utopian position at another. Whatever else the critic may do, the important task is to keep architecture on the move - to keep it flexible and capable of representing new contexts with a uniform language. Above all else the critic proposes historical change as the frame of reference for all architectural activity. With this in mind, the critic will assist in the resolution of architectural crisis by articulating the communicational problems which beset current activity. The solution to crises is not to propose pre-determined solutions, but to force them to take their inevitable course, whatever that may be.
When an architecture has reached an Involutionary phase of its history - a situation clearly evident in the multiplying variations of the same theme - the critic accentuates its fragmentation by focussing on its internal differences. At the other end of the developmental spectrum, when architecture is thoroughly diversified into discrete and different types as in an Evolutionary period, the analytical task is reversed. Critical and avant garde analysis has to go below the differences between types in order to find some common denominator which can link them into a unified architectural language. The prevailing tendency during such periods is not to prolong this formal anarchy but rather, given the integrative tendencies of the typological process, to bring about a more comprehensive architectural routine. This is not done consciously of course. It is an effect of the exchange between many architects who cannot foresee the end result of their joint actions. Nor is it a product of avant garde architects or critics whose role is simply to model or name evolving tendencies in this mass of work.
In a Plural State, architecture does not simply keep producing new types but also condenses others into potentially comprehensive types. The fact that such types may 'fail' in the sense that they are not permitted to enter a developmental phase is not the issue. That is an effect of the diversity of commissioning sources during such periods. The continued fertility of types during an Evolutionary or Pragmatic period is – virtually - the search for a potential classic type. It is this tendency which critical activity seeks to reinforce. In a more pragmatic and superficial way, decoration performs the same function as the critical commentary by attempting to UNIFY the diversity of each type until it can generate its own authentic typical set. The critical enquiry covers the whole of architecture in its search for CONVERGENT tendencies and in this it facilitates the goal of the typological process; the synthesis of similarity out of diversity.
One can relate the two aspects of the critical activity described above by comparing the two differing states of architecture in which it must function:
In the Involutionary state: there are less differences in architecture than there are in the world.
In Evolutionary states: there are more differences in architecture than there are in the world.
One can, in turn, relate these two historical phases of architecture to the question of 'meaning'. The consequences of each of these phases is suggested in the following passage from Levi-Strauss' essay, 'The Sorcerer and his Magic' where he discusses the difference between what he calls 'normal' and 'pathological' thinking:
"In a universe which it strives to understand but whose dynamics it cannot fully control, normal thought continually seeks the meaning of things which refuse to reveal their significance. So-called pathological thought on the other hand, overflows with emotional interpretations and overtones, in order to supplement an otherwise deficient reality. For normal thinking there exists something which cannot be empirically verified and is, therefore, 'claimable'. For pathological thinking there exist experiences without object, or something 'available'. We might borrow from a deficit of meaning, whereas so-called pathological thought (in at least some of its manifestations) disposes of a plethora of meaning." (Structural Anthropology; Peregrine 1979).
When all experience must be channelled through the few elements of the Involutionary Type then they will inevitably concentrate upon themselves a vast range of associations. One can put it this way, one element will not simply represent one 'experience', but many. It will 'overflow' with meanings. On the other hand, when that same range of experiences is channelled through a large number of different elements then each of them will trigger few associations. They will mean very little. One could imagine a situation where each element would represent only one specific experience and no other. One would be unable to predict its potential relationship with other elements so unique would it be in its function. This could be taken further since one could imagine a situation where there were more representational elements than there were experiences to be represented. There would, therefore, be a 'deficient of meaning' for these elements.
The material goal of the critic is a classical architecture which balances, within the capacity of its typical set, these two dimensions of form and meaning. A set which is economic in that it can represent experience with a limited number of elements: which allows one to predict, within certain limits, the consequences of the selection and combination of its elements. It is also a set which is comprehensive in that it will allow representation of any possible experience. These two constraints on a typical set are not mutually exclusive but complementary. For pathological thought their coexistence within the same set is an insoluble problem which can only be resolved, as suggested before, by splitting them into two distinct operations (and sets), the stereotypical elements and decoration. However, when they are combined within one set the result is a limited number of elements whose character can only be identified in the most general way for the form of these elements can be stretched to suit many different situations.
In one historical period the critic will facilitate the unravelling of a Type towards difference (towards a 'many'), while in another he or she will facilitate the condensation of several types towards similarity (towards the 'one'). This is the manner in which the critic REGULATES the development of architecture and, at the same time alleviates the sometimes unrepresentative and arbitrary organization forced upon it by historical circumstances.
8. Regulation from Inside and Outside
With different means, the architectural critic and the avant-garde architect strive to ensure the continued development of architecture as an effective and authentic system of representation. Both of them recognize that because a particular set of forms exist in the world it need not necessarily be serving some useful function. It may simply be the DEBRIS left over from previous events. They recognize that what exists is not necessarily ‘true’: that what may have come into the world as form to serve some particular purpose does not automatically evaporate when the purpose which it served has long since gone. It may continue to exist as a ritualistic element which blocks further organic development of the system. Very simply, it is a routine which cannot be UNLEARNED but only transcended by experience and a new level of learning.
The different means which the critic and the architect use to engineer change in architecture complement each other in the joint task of transcending a 'failed' architecture. Whereas the words used by the critic allow a greater degree of semiotic freedom in exposing the failures of an architecture, it is, at the same time, incapable of providing alternatives to present circumstances. The architect, on the other hand is, by means of architectural form, able to propose an alternative set of forms to those which exist. However, he or she cannot simultaneously say WHY these forms should replace those of the prevailing Type. There is nothing in the forms themselves which clearly indicate that they are 'better' than others. Only the discursive freedom of words can indicate why one set of forms is more authentic than another or the fact that a certain set of forms is in some way unrepresentative of experience. This can be seen as an EXPLICIT form of criticism for it has the power to say 'No' to a particular architecture and also state the reasons for its negation. The alternative forms proposed by avant-garde architects are an IMPLICIT criticism of the status quo for they can only negate an existing architecture by their pure difference from it. As an analogue means of express - it cannot say 'NO' to anything: there are no 'negative' architectural forms.
While these complementary forms of criticism are part of the apparatus by which an architecture regulates itself, they are only highly visible examples of the more general process. (Avant-garde work forms only a fraction of all architectural production). They merely articulate that more general process of regulation which takes place in production as a whole and which results in the current state of architectural form at any given time. The permutation of stereotyped typical elements, the over-articulation of the form of buildings, the addition of sometimes bizarre decoration, and so on, all reflect a continuing attempt by architects to offset the problems of representation which they face. Regulation, therefore, is not something which is ADDED to an architecture by the work of particularly sensitive or acute avant-garde minds, but is IMMANENT in the shape of the whole architecture. For instance, the character of an Involutionary architecture is the way it is precisely because architects are trying to alleviate the paradoxes generated by the need to act authentically within a totally-determined architectural Type. Up to a point, the devices which they use to overcome this problem actually work and do provide an effective means of communication within the restrictions imposed on practice by an already-unified Type. Indeed, the use of these regulatory devices can produce an architecture of great expressive power and richness of association. But, the chronological continuity of the socioeconomic environment within which this takes place eventually renders such devices ineffective and results in their debasement. They are exaggerated to the point of being meaningless; although even this disintegration of architectural form must be seen as an attempt at regulating architecture in the face of impossible odds. Depending on the duration of this post-classical phase in an architecture's history, this 'internal' regulation will or will not succeed in holding architectural within the limits of intelligibility. Beyond a certain chronological point, architecture will slip quickly towards the state of a GAME played out with 'pure', but in themselves, meaningless forms. Since the time-scale of the socioeconomic system is (relative to architecture), unpredictable, it is possible that temporary reconstructions can take place. A change in circumstances (eg. a period of economic expansion), may slow down the 'slippage' allowing some sort of regulation to take place. On the other hand, a violent and unforeseen economic change towards plurality may cut short attempts to regulate architectural form by suddenly exploding the number of commissioning sources. In this case, the architecture will disintegrate very quickly.
Thus, the particular state of an architecture is determined by this combination of internal and external regulations. Add to this the state and the particular character of the repertoire established by a previous cycle of activity, and one can sense the immense complexity of the architecture of any one period.
No comments:
Post a Comment